Aug 24

By Sarah Collerton

Pilots are afraid that a Jetstar training program will put cadets with “substantially less” experience in charge of aircraft.

About 400 pilots from all Australian airlines met in Sydney yesterday over Jetstar’s plan to move jobs offshore.

But the pilots also aired their concerns over Jetstar’s cadetship training program, saying pilot “experience levels have dropped substantially”.

The Australian and International Pilots Association (AIPA) says pilots traditionally require a minimum of 1,000 to 1,500 hours’ flying experience before getting in the pilot’s seat.

But Jetstar’s cadetship program would see potential pilots with no flying experience in the cockpit of a Jetstar plane after 18 months of accelerated training, or about 200 hours of in-the-air training.

AIPA president Barry Jackson says pilots in this program will not have enough experience to fly commercial planes.

“We’re introducing a lower level of experienced pilot in an aircraft,” he said.

“Cadets have a lot less hours … and with the expansion that is likely to go on around the Asia-Pacific region, we will see a lot less experienced pilots entering flight decks.

“To put a fairly inexperienced pilot in the right-hand seat of a jet or a high-speed turbine puts a lot of pressure on the pilot in the left-hand seat.

“We want to ensure proper training is carried out throughout all the industry so that our standards are kept up to the very high levels we’ve come to expect in Australia.”

Regional airlines REX and Skytrans recently introduced their own fast-tracked programs, as the use of similar schemes takes off around the world.

Mr Jackson says accidents are on the rise and proper training is needed because of such training.

“As we’ve seen around the world, there are more and more incidents and accidents that are related to poor training and inexperience,” he said.

Under the program, would-be pilots pay an upfront fee to Jetstar and the rest of their training fees come out of their future pay packets.

Mr Jackson says airlines are putting savings ahead of passenger safety.

“Airlines these days are always trying to find a cheaper alternative,” he said.

“Airline fares have dropped a lot and therefore the airline companies have to find ways of saving money.

“Young pilots have to pay a substantial amount of money to enter the industry and then work on a reduced salary for the first few years so therefore it is a saving for the airline.”

But a Jetstar spokesman rejects the safety concerns, saying the budget airline “conducts its business to the highest safety standards”.

“This is about providing the opportunity for highly skilled individuals to take a streamlined approach to entry into a major domestic and international airline with a world-class quality provider,” he said.

“Further, they will participate in a funding arrangement where candidates avoid the significant up-front fees should this be done by them individually.”

Jetstar says cadets pay $21,000 up front and the remaining cost “will be paid by the individual through regular repayments as part of their employment with Jetstar”.

The Jetstar pilot training courses are run in partnership with Oxford Aviation Academy (OAA) and Swinburne University in Melbourne.

OAA managing director Anthony Petteford told the ABC the academy would not comment on safety concerns with the program.

When contacted by the ABC,  Swinburne University would also not comment on the program.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/08/24/2991996.htm

Jul 24

The Georgia Business Aviation Association (GBAA) will hold its annual Safety Day on September 1 at the Hilton/Atlanta Marietta in Marietta, GA. This year’s program features a briefing by NTSB Vice Chairmen Robert Sumwalt, in addition to presentations on safety management systems, crew resource management and hypoxia awareness. For more information about the event or to register, visit:
http://www.gbaa.org/events.htm

Source

Jun 6
Korean J Aerosp Environ Med. 2003 Jun;13(2):75-87. Korean.
Kim DW, Shim JC, Seung IS, Lee JM, Ahn HC, Kim C.

Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine, College of Medicine, Hanyang University, Korea.
Department of Physiology, School of Medicine, Eulji University, Korea. ckim@eulji.ac.kr

Abstract
Hypoxia is a serious aviation problem and can always be a source of dangerous aerospace accidents. Hypoxic chamber flight training used to evaluate hypoxia tolerance via TUC (time of useful consciousness) and to become aware of hypoxic symptoms. Because TUC depends on subjective symptoms and lacks strict objectivity, pulse oximetry monitoring has become useful in the aviation environment. In this study, we monitored arterial oxygen saturation (SaO2) by pulse oximetry in the ROKAF subjects (n=33) experiencing hypoxia at the simulated altitude of 25,000 ft. The duration from mask-off to mask-on (TUC), the duration from mask-off to the time of SaO2 of 90% (T90), the duration from 90% to 70% of SaO2(T70), and the SaO2 value at mask-on (bottom SaO2) were examined. The mean bottom SaO2 and TUC were 64.5% and 180 sec, respectively. The subjective hypoxic symptoms were facial flushing, thinking impairment, dyspnea, sweating, anxiety, and so on, in descending order. The majority of the subjects put on their mask before 70% of SaO2 was reached or before they felt any severe symptoms. In comparison with the data of JASDF (Yoneda, 2000), TUC, T90, and T70 were longer in JASDF, but bottom SaO2 and pulse increasing rate during hypoxia (PR/TUC) were higher in ROKAF. Also, TUC in the subjects of this study was much shorter than those of 10 years ago. These may be due to different training protocols, but not enough data exists to explain such difference. The need for the reconsideration of the hypoxic training from the various viewpoints is raised.

May 27
Failure of the pressurization system
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Failure of the pressurization system and the resulting decompression can produce significant problems for those on board. Slow decompression of the cabin is dangerous because of the insidious onset of hypoxia, while rapid decompression presents dangerous physiological risks.

A number of factors control the rate and time of decompression. The larger the cabin area, the slower the decompression time. The larger the opening, the faster the decompression. And the larger the pressure differential between the outside atmosphere and the cabin interior, the more severe the decompression, which in general explains the rapid type of decompression more common at higher altitudes.

FULL TEXT

May 15
DHC-8-402 Dash 8, G-JECN incident
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Date of occurrence: 05 January 2010

Summary:

G-JECN departed from Southampton Airport without difficulty; however, during the climb to FL240 the co-pilot noticed an excessive climb rate on the pressurisation system which was shortly followed by the pressurisation fault annunciator. The flight crew attempted to correct the fault, however they were unsuccessful so went on to oxygen, declared a MAYDAY and completed an emergency descent. The MAYDAY was subsequently downgraded to a PAN and the aircraft safely returned to Southampton Airport. Cabin crew and passengers were checked and found to be fit and well. Post-incident investigation indicated that a faulty aft pressure outflow valve was the probable cause of the pressurisation failure.


May 11

Nearly every training text on this topic prescribes the same general procedures: Upon first detection of a loss of pressurization, pilots should immediately don an oxygen mask, select 100 percent oxygen flow and, at higher altitudes, select the “emergency” volume of oxygen flow to ensure a positive flow of oxygen into the mask. Then immediate descent to an altitude that will minimize the physiological effects of the pressure loss should be considered.

Apr 22

One of the most recent mishandled loss-of-cabin-pressurization incidents occurred Aug. 14, 2005, to a Helios Airways Boeing 737 en route from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Athens. The crew failed to set the pressurization system to “Auto” and minutes after takeoff the cabin altitude horn activated, indicating the cabin altitude exceeded 10,000 feet. The crew mistook the alarm as the takeoff configuration warning.

FULL TEXT

Mar 22
Lessons learnt from Helios disaster
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The European Aviation Safety Authority, EASA, issued a safety information bulletin at the end of last year that incorporated recommendations from the Greek Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board.  The recommendations were provided by the Greek Authorities in an accident report into the 2005 Helios Airways crash.

The accident occured in August, when the Boeing 737-300 crashed after exhausting its fuel supply with everyone on board unconscious due to hypoxia.  All 121 passengers and crew were killed with no injuries on the ground as the jet came down on sparsely populated land near the approach to Athens airport.

The investigation discovered that following maintenance a switch on the presurisation panel (see image below) had been inadvertantly left in the ‘Manual’ position.  The pilots subsequently missed two oppurtunities in the check lists prior to take off to check that the switch was in ‘Auto’. As a result the aircraft did not pressurise on departure and the crew misidentified the pressurisation warnings.

The main outcome of the investigation has been the EASA bulletin relating to cabin crew members duties should the oxygen masks deploy on departure or during a climb.  In the future if the arcraft does not immediatly stop climbing or begin a descent the flight attendant nearest the cockpit is to knock on the door informing the pilots and ensuring they have donned their oxygen masks.

There are also further recommendations being studied which include mandatory hypoxia training for all crew in simulation devices, the installation of damage protected imaging devices in the cockpit to keep a record of all switch movements and the possibility of including cabin altitude as a parameter on Flight Data Recorders, FDRs.

Mar 18

4 May 2009. B747.  Pressurisation system failed after take-off due to failure of air conditioning packs to function when selected after take-off.  Flight climb restricted to FL100. Pressurisation  eventually re-selected successfully and flight continued.

21 June 2009.  A330.  Aircraft dispatched with Bleed 2 inoperative in accordance with Minimum Equipment List. On descent Bleed 1 failed, leading to cabin altitude climbing to 10,400 ft.

20 Sep 2009. Airbus A319. At about 3500ft aircraft depressurised on approach. Crew and passengers suffered discomfort with their ears. Flight crew error.

24 October 2009. Airbus A319. Aircraft dispatched  with Engine bleed 1 Fault. Engine Bleed 2 Fault occurred in flight.  MAYDAY declared and aircraft descended to continue at lower altitude.

06 November 2009 DHC8.   Pressurisation being operated in manual No pressurisation in climb. Aircraft returned to departure airfield.

09 November 2009.  Airbus A319.  Loss of cabin pressure at top of climb following bleed valve fault. Crew donned oxygen masks. MAYDAY declared and emergency decent to FL100.  Some passengers suffered ear pressure problems.

09 November 2009.  Airbus A320.  Unusually noisy airflow passing FL250 in climb  followed by master caution warning. High cabin rate after avionics door unlatched. URGENCY declared and aircraft diverted.

13 November 2009. Airbus A319. Cabin pressure and excessive cabin altitude warning passing FL90 on climb. Aircraft returned. Cabin pressure mode selector switch in ‘MANUAL’

17 November 2009 DHC8  During descent cabin altitude started to climb in excess of 3500 ft/min on reaching 8,000 ft but rate of descent increased. Blow out panel in rear hold found to be out of its fixture.

18 November 2009.  DHC8.   During level flight at 10,000 feet both pilots felt onrush of cold air and ears began to pop. Flight maintained at 10,000 ft. Following landing blow-out panel found to have detached.

MORE INFO

Mar 16
Helios crash recommendations drive EASA action
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SOURCE: Flight International

The Helios accident was the result of an aircraft climbing to its cruising level without automatic cabin pressurisation selected, the pilots misinterpreting the cabin pressure alert when it operated, and the aircraft flying its programmed route from Cyprus to Greece on flight director/autopilot with all on board unconscious from hypoxia.

The crash occurred in an uninhabited area near the approach to Athens airport when the fuel ran out. All 121 people on board died.

EASA has undertaken to examine rulemaking ….  the mandatory provision of hypoxia awareness training for pilots and cabin crew, using simulation equipment the reduces the proportion of oxygen in the air supplied to the trainees while they perform tasks.

FULL INFO

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